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Abstract—Due to the rapid increase of digitization within our 
society, digital identities gain more and more importance. Pro-
vided by the German eID solution, every citizen has the ability to 
identify himself against various governmental and private orga-
nizations with the help of his personal electronic ID card and a 
corresponding card reader. While there are several solutions 
available for desktop use of the eID infrastructure, mobile ap-
proaches have to be payed more attention. In this paper we 
present a new approach for using the German eID concept on an 
Android device without the need of the actual identity card and 
card reader. A security evaluation of our approach reveals that 
two non-critical vulnerabilities on the architecture can't be 
avoided. Nevertheless, no sensitive information are compromised. 
A proof of concept shows that an actual implementation faces 
some technical issues which have to be solved in the future. 
Keywords - Android Security; German eID; Secure Element; 
Trusted Execution Environment; Mobile Authentication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Germany introduced the electronic ID card (eID) on No-
vember, 1st 2010. In combination with a desktop client and an 
RFID card reader, it enables citizens and legal residents to 
identify themselves online against private and governmental 
organizations (eID offerer). However, a consumer research 
from 2015 determined that only about 5% of all Germans used 
their eID for online authentication services within the past 12 
months [12]. 
We can think of two important reasons. First, only few ser-
vices with eID support are available on the market. Thus, 
users may not see a significant benefit in using the eID. Se-
cond, ID card holders feel inconvenient in using the eID. A 
user study by Willomitzer et al. figured out that using the re-
quired card reader and installing the necessary drivers are one 
of the biggest usability problems and result in a high cancella-
tion rate [29]. 
In this paper, we present an eID concept that eliminates the 
requirement of a card reader by relying on the user's smart-
phone instead of an ID card. During an initial setup phase, an 
eID token will be installed on the users smartphone. Online 
authentication services can then be used without the user's ID 
card. This could increase the acceptance rate of eID among 
citizens and legal residents. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we present related 
work and an outline in Sec. II. In Sec. III we will introduce 
the technologies that are used for our architecture in Sec. IV. 
In Sec. V, the results of our security evaluation are presented. 
Finally, we will discuss our prototype implementation in Sec. 
VI and summarize all results in Sec. VII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Existing projects provide a mobile application for the Ger-
man eID by using the internal NFC controller, an external 
Bluetooth card reader, or an USB card reader [21, 22]. Besides 
the lack of usability by using an external device during the 
authentication process, Android's NFC stack is unable to 
handle extended Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) 
commands [18]. As the eID process uses extended APDUs for 
communication, it is incompatible with Android smartphones. 
Additionally, existing eID applications only initiate the au-
thentication process and act as a management component. All 
security relevant operations of the process are performed by 
the smart card chip inside the ID card. 
Schröder developed and evaluated a concept that enables 
storing and using derived identities on a smartphone securely 
[26]. He demonstrated his approach in a proof of concept with 
the German eID and a corresponding wireless card reader. 
While this is important work and describes details about ma-
naging identities on smartphones, it still relies on a card rea-
der. In Sec. I we mentioned, that the card reader is one of the 
biggest usability problems. Therefore the proposed solution 
could be improved. 
Other countries in the European Union also provide mobile 
authentication solutions for their citizens. In Austria for ex-
ample one can register for the so called "Handy-Signatur" [1] 
which is a mobile signature system offered by the Graz Uni-
versity of Technology, the Austrian Government and Austrian 
National Bank. This project, initialized 2009, first used SMS-
TANs for authentication. Today a corresponding smartphone 
app can be used instead. Another solution for mobile authenti-
cation by the Austrian state printing office is "My Identity 
App" (MIA) [24]. MIA stores all governmental identification 
documents, like passport, drivers license, etc. centralized in a 
digital format.  
Both Austrian approaches have in common, that they re-
quire a cloud backed infrastructure. All sensitive personal in-
formation is processed and stored on the provider's servers. 
This stands in contrast to our following approach were the 
sensitive data is never revealed to a third-party. 
Apple Pay, a mobile payment service, serves as an example 
for a successful usage of digital identities. A survey from 2015 
showed a high acceptance rate, with 39% of all iPhone 6 users 
in the US and UK already using it and an additional 30% of 
participants who would like to use it in the future [17]. 
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
Saving a sovereign identity on a mobile device leads to new 
security requirements. The storage and transmission of an 
identity to the eID offerer has to be protected with a similar 
security level as on eID cards which use a secure element. 
Thus we rely on the secure element and trusted execution 
environment of an Android phone that are described in this 
section. Also a short overview of the underlying eID process 
is given. 
A. Online Authentication (eID process) 
The German eID system enables the owner of a German ID 
card (eID) to identify himself against various service provi-
ders (eID offerer) in the governmental and private sector. The-
refore all components involved in the eID process have to 
fulfill certain requirements described in technical guidelines, 
published by the German Federal Office for Information Secu-
rity (BSI) [5]. The security and privacy aspects of the used 
protocols are addressed in various papers and articles [3, 4]. 
1. eID process between citizen and eID offerer 
Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of an eID process 
which will be explained in the following: 
• The user wants to identify himself against an eID of-
ferer. Therefore he clicks on an special hyperlink 
(TcTokenURL) on the website of the eID offerer. 
• The user's browser forwards the URL to the eID client 
application. 
• The client software recognizes the TcTokenURL and 
fetches the request (TcToken) containing the required 
personal data of the user (name, surname, date of 
birth, ...) and the responsible eID server for the current 
eID process.  
• The eID client establishes a secure connection to the 
eID server and starts the authentication process be-
tween the eID card and the eID server. Finally the id 
card sends the required personal data to the eID 
server. 
• The eID offerer receives the needed personal data of 
the user from the eID server. The user is redirected to 
an authenticated web session with the eID offerer.  
To ensure a secure connection between eID card and eID 
server the EAC (Extended Access Control) protocol [5] is 
used. It authenticates the two involved participants against 
each other and is divided in two subprotocols called Terminal 
Authentication (TA) and Chip Authentication (CA). TA gua-
rantees a valid and authentic communication between eID 
card and eID server. CA guarantees the eID server to commu-
nicate with a valid and authentic eID card. To provide this, 
Public-Key-Infrastructures are used (Country Verifying Certi-
ficate Authority (CVCA) and Country Signing Certificate 
Authority (CSCA)) with CVCA and CSCA certificates as root 
instances. The underlying cryptographic primitive is a Diffie–
Hellman key exchange, the public keys of both parties are 
authenticated using signature algorithms.  
B. Secure Element 
A Secure Element is a tamper-resistant microcontroller that 
provides a secure environment for applications and data [16]. 
Its computing power and storage capacity are limited and can 
be found on the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), SD 
card or on a non-replaceable chip embedded in the smartpho-
ne (see Fig. 2). 
The secure element is divided into security domains that 
can be programmed using Java Card applets [23].  
2.  Secure Element form factor overview on mobile devices 
A Trusted Service Manager (TSM) is the link between the 
secure element manufacturer (issuer) and the application de-
veloper (service provider). The TSM is responsible for provi-
sioning and personalizing the secure element. Without a TSM, 
the service provider must have a contract with every issuer.  
C. Trusted Execution Environment 
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) enables the exe-
cution of security-critical applications inside a runtime envi-
ronment separated from the rest of the system [28]. This isola-
ted environment can be implemented as an external coproces-
sor or as different runtime modes on the main CPU. Many 
microprocessors on the today's market (e.g. ARM, AMD, In-
tel) feature a TEE. 
Focusing on mobile systems, ARM CPUs are currently 
most relevant for this consideration. In ARMs TEE implemen-
tation TrustZone [2], trustlets are security-critical applications 
that can be executed in an isolated environment (secure 
world), while the actual Rich OS is running in a non-isolated 
environment (normal world), see Fig. 3. Both worlds have 
their own virtual allocated storage area on the physical RAM 
and in the registers of the CPU. Communication between the 
worlds is managed by a monitor, located in the secure world 
and waiting for requests (Secure Monitor Calls) from the 
normal world. 
3. Schematic representation of the ARM TrustZone architecture 
IV. DESIGN 
A. Initialization 
In this section the architecture and installation process is 
described. Issuer, TSM and Service Provider each have a local 
instance (security domain/applet) and a remote instance (ex-
ternal server). During the smartphone's manufacturing pro-
cess, only the security domain of the issuer is installed. The 
initialization procedure is based on GlobalPlatform specifica-
tions [14]. Figure 4 shows all instances and their connections. 
1) Initial setup: The user installs the eID app from Google's 
Play Store. The app checks if a TEE and a secure element 
are available and if so, it installs the trustlet for the TEE. 
2) Installing TSM's security domain: The Android app sends 
a request for installing a new security domain (also called 
supplementary security domains (SSD)) to TSM's remote 
instance. The TSM forwards the command to the remote 
instance of the issuer.  
Local and remote instance of the issuer authenticate each 
other by using a challenge-response protocol.  
The issuer's remote instance sends an encrypted installati-
on command to his local instance and sets new access 
keys for the TSM. The issuer sends the new keys to the 
TSM, who can directly connect to his new local instance 
for setting his own keys. 
4. Mobile eID architecture with Service Provider, TSM, Issuer, eID 
server, eID offerer, TEE, and secure element.  
Left side: Actors and communication channels during initialization 
process.  
Right side: Actors and communication channels during authentica-
tion process.  
Inside the TEE (e.g. ARMs TrustZone), users can enter secret in-
formation. The TEE also works as a bridge between the non-isola-
ted environment and the secure element. Inside the secure element, 
isolated security domains and applets are implemented that are 
managed by their external instances. Dashed lines show that this 
communication channel can only be used for setting new encryption 
and authentication keys, based on GlobalPlatform's definition [14]. 
3) Installing the applet: The implementation of protocols 
and installation of certificates is needed to support the 
eID process. Thus an applet for the Android app and the 
root certificates CVCA and CSCA have to be installed. 
The TSM's remote instance sends an encrypted and si-
gned applet to the issuer, whose local instance is respon-
sible for installing the applet. TSM's local instance has to 
verify the applet to release the installation process. This 
verification process is called DAP-Verification [14]. Af-
terwards the service provider has its own non-personali-
zed applet inside the security domain. 
4) Personalize security domain: To protect the Android app 
against abuse, an access PIN is needed, which is define 
by the user during the personalization process.  
A key exchange is used to establish a secure connection 
between the service provider and its applet. As Android's 
NFC stack is incompatible with German eID (see Sec. II), 
we use the smartphone camera for capturing the ID card. 
This process is legally compliant with the German Money 
Laundering Act [7] and is already practiced by some 
German-based companies.  
Beside the traditional PIN of the ID card, a personal pri-
vate key (represented by a QR-Code) has to be added to 
the postal letter of the sovereign service provider, that is 
sent to the citizen after ordering an ID card.  
By capturing the ID card and this key, the mobile eID has 
the same security level as the traditional eID process (see 
Sec. V). The external service provider receives the captu-
red data and checks its integrity. If the validation process 
is successful and the ID card wasn't used for a smartpho-
ne initialization process before (this avoids cloning eID 
tokens), the service provider sends back the eID token 
containing all personalized information, concatenated 
with the private key of the Chip Authentication (see Sec. 
III-A) to the security domain. The data package is encryp-
ted with the public key of the QR-Code. The applet can 
decrypt the token, encrypt it with a symmetric key and 
store the data on Android's file system. This is necessary 
as the smart card only provides little storage capacity. The 
private key for the Chip Authentication remains inside the 
secure element. 
5) Authentication process: After the installation process, the 
eID token is installed and the ID card is not needed any-
more. The eID token's decryption key can only be acces-
sed by entering the PIN into the TEE. After retrieving the 
key, the secure element in the smartphone can act like the 
secure element in the ID card. 
B. Authentication 
The authentication protocols (see Sec. III-A) used by the 
eID app are determined in TR-03110 [5]. Some modifications 
regarding the access policy are necessary. The communication 
channels and all actors are shown in Fig. 4.  
• The user clicks on the eID offerer's link. A secure 
connection between Android app and eID server is 
established. 
• By entering the PIN into the TEE, the access for the 
user to the secure element is granted. 
• The terminal authentication between secure element 
and eID server is carried out. 
• The chip authentication between secure element and 
eID server is carried out. 
• The encrypted token in the untrusted system storage is 
received by the secure element and gets decrypted by 
the key stored inside the secure element. 
• The user determines what kind of personal data inside 
the TEE should be redirected to the eID server. 
• Secure element and eID server can directly communi-
cate using encrypted and authenticated APDU com-
mands. 
• Once the authentication process is finished, the access 
to the secure element is locked again. 
V. SECURITY EVALUATION 
The evaluation is based on the design in Sec. IV and will be 
divided into the following steps: 
1. Initialization: Description of business processes and 
security objectives 
2. Structural Analysis: Description of actors, compo-
nents and communication channels 
3. Security Requirements: Definition of assets that need 
to be protected and analysis of their protective needs 
4. Modeling of IT Architecture: Summary of actors and 
components 
5. Description of Protective Measures: Protective mea-
sures are established to ensure the security of assets 
that need to be protected. Specific security functions 
are used to implement the protective measures. 
6. Evaluation of Protective Measures 
A. Initialization 
We consider the use cases initialization and authentication. 
A description of these use cases can be found in Sec. IV-A and 
IV-B, respectively. 
We will distinguish between the security objectives confi-
dentiality, authenticity and availability: 
1. Confidentiality: Protecting data from disclosure to 
unauthorized parties 
2. Authenticity: Ensure, that data was not sent by unau-
thorized parties (includes integrity). 
3. Availability: Ensure, that data can be accessed by au-
thorized parties when needed. 
B. Structural Analysis 
All actors and communication channels are described in 
Sec. IV. We assume, that the existing protocols for the authen-
tication process are secure. Security evaluations regarding the 
communication between smartphone, eID offerer and eID 
server already exist [25]. We do not need to evaluate the 
communications between two external instances for the same 
reason. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to investigate the following com-
ponents, that are necessary to get the personalized token on 
the smartphone at the initial setup (use case initialization) and 
using the personalized token for authentication (use case au-
thentication): 
• Smartphone including all components and their com-
munication 
• Android app 
• Internal storage of Android app 
• Host CPU 
• TEE 
• Secure element 
• Issuer 
• TSM 
• Service Provider 
• Communication between Android app and security 
domains (over TEE) 
• Communication between Android app and issuer 
• Communication between Android app and TSM 
C. Security Requirements 
Due to the high protection needs of the business process 
"authentication" (see Sec. IV), the asset "eID token" has high 
protection needs and thereby the smartphone and the compo-
nents being in contact with this asset as well. Furthermore, we 
can determine the protection needs by analyzing the asset 
"eID token" regarding their specific security objectives: 
• Confidentiality: High protection needs regarding con-
fidentiality, because the eID token contains personali-
zed data. By having access to all data stored inside the 
token, an attacker could harm the user. 
• Authenticity: High protection needs regarding authen-
ticity, because the business process aims to authenti-
cate the user with the help of the eID token on diffe-
rent services. For examples, using the eID token for 
opening a bank account requires a high security level.  
• Availability: Normal protection needs regarding avail-
ability. If an authorized user isn't able to access the 
eID token when it's needed, he can't authenticate on-
line and loses comfort. 
It can be concluded, that an attacker can cause high damage 
by manipulating or having access to another eID token. In 
combination with the high spread of Android malware [10] 
and thereby a high probability of being attacked, a high risk 
exists. 
D. Modeling of IT Architecture 
As a summary of Sec. IV, Fig. 4 shows all actors and com-
ponents during the initialization and authentication process. 
E. Description of Protective Measures 
In this section we will describe the protective measures that 
are necessary to fulfill the security requirements mentioned in 
Sec. V-C. 
1) Keys of issuer: Issuer keys are needed to ensure a confi-
dential and authentic communication between issuer and 
its security domain. During the manufacturing process, 
the symmetric keys S-ENC and S-MAC are stored inside 
the issuer's security domain. The keys don't leave the se-
cure element. The issuer and its security domain calculate 
a session encryption key by encrypting a random number 
with the key S-ENC. To ensure the authentication of mes-
sages sent between issuer and its security domain, the 
cryptographic algorithm HMAC with the key S-MAC is 
used. 
2) Keys of TSM: After the issuer installs a security domain 
for the TSM, the access keys of the security domain are 
transferred from the issuer to the TSM. The TSM can now 
access his new security domain over an confidential and 
authentic communication channel. The GlobalPlatform 
specification [14] allows a connection without the help of 
the issuer (see dotted lines in Fig. 4) if the TSM sets new 
keys. Thereby the issuer can't manipulate or tap further 
communication between TSM and its security domain. 
3) Access PIN for Android application: Only the smartphone 
owner should use his credentials stored inside the smart-
phone to authenticate against an eID offerer. The user 
enters his PIN inside the TEE to ensure, that no attacker 
can tap his inputs. The PIN is evaluated inside the secure 
element by the internal Java Card applet of the service 
provider. 
4) Personal private key (QR code): Nobody should be allo-
wed to store the eID token of another person on his 
smartphone. A two-factor authentication is used during 
the initialization process to ensure only the ID owner is 
able to use the eID token. An additional QR code, which 
represents a private key, is printed on the letter received 
by the ID owner. The associated public key is used by the 
service provider to encrypt the eID token. The user scans 
his QR code inside the TEE. To decrypt the received eID 
token, the personal private key is necessary. 
5) eID token's symmetric encryption/decryption key: The 
limited resources of the secure element prevent the persis-
tent storage of the eID token. Therefore the token has to 
be stored on Android's file system. A symmetric key is 
generated and stored on the secure element to encrypt and 
decrypt the eID token.  
F. Evaluation of Protective Measures 
The evaluation of the used cryptographic algorithms and 
physical attacks against the secure element are excluded. It's 
assumed that the TSM is trustworthy, the attacker has limited 
resources and no implementation errors have been made. 
All commands that are executed on the Host CPU of the 
Android smartphone are particularly critical, because of high 
attack potential. As a result, two vulnerabilities have been 
found: 
1) Sniffing SELECT commands: The SELECT command is 
responsible for addressing the correct security domain 
inside the secure element. The GlobalPlatform organizat-
ion is responsible for defining secure element standards. 
In their definition about the communication, it is said, that 
no encryption of the SELECT command is possible. Thus 
it is possible to obtain information about the identification 
number of the security domain. No harmful attacks can be 
executed with this information, because the security do-
main can only be accessed by the eID Android application 
and with an additional PIN. 
2) Relay attack: During the installation of the security do-
main from the TSM or service provider, an attacker could 
redirect the commands between Android app and the se-
cure element. If a user compares the installation process 
of the security element in a TEE with the installation pro-
cess in a rich execution environment, it would be possible 
to detect a successful attack in the past. No sensitive in-
formation is compromised with this attack. During the 
personalization process, the transferred token can also be 
redirected. Due to cryptographic mechanisms, attackers 
can't decrypt the sensitive information. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
As the implementation is still work in progress, an over-
view of the successfully finished tasks will be given. The fol-
lowing is divided into two subsections, addressing different 
aspects of the provided architecture in Sec. IV. With the help 
of the Android prototype in Sec. VI-A, usability aspects re-
garding the eID process on Android smartphones can be ana-
lyzed. Sec. VI-B lists requirements smartphones must meet to 
support our mobile eID solution. 
A. Usability Prototype 
The native Android prototype was developed for usability 
testing and does not provide any application logic for dealing 
with a real identity card. It emulates the specified eID functio-
nality (initialization, eID process), shown in Fig. 5, by serving 
dummy data which gives the possibility to monitor user beha-
vior in lab tests. Additionally a feature to find supported eID 
offerer in the Google Play Store or on the web was added to 
the prototype as well. 
The usability of our implemented application has been eva-
luated by Kostic et al. [19]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Usability prototype of the eID application on Android.  
Upper left: Main menu, upper right: my ID card  
Lower left: initialization, lower right: eID process 
B. Technical Evaluation 
The architecture in Sec. IV makes use of two hardware 
components (ARM TrustZone and secure element) to 
strengthen the security of the mobile eID concept on Android. 
In the following, existing technical solutions for Android are 
evaluated. First, the requirements which have to be fulfilled 
by each component will be mentioned. Then, existing solu-
tions will be provided. Finally, a proof of concept will be dis-
cussed. 
1) ARM TrustZone 
a) Requirements: Access to the ARM TrustZone on An-
droid devices as well as the ability to install, manage and 
remove developed trustlets. 
b) Existing Solutions: As described in Sec. III-C, most 
current Android smartphones on the market provide an 
ARM TrustZone. The bare Android OS itself only uses 
the TrustZone for key generation / storing and DRM pur-
poses. Some smartphone manufacturer like Samsung also 
integrate real-time kernel protection and secure applicati-
on environments (e.g. KNOX) into their custom Android 
and TrustZone versions [20]. The communication bet-
ween the Android OS and the trustlets inside the TrustZo-
ne is commonly managed by a binary blob driver in the 
kernel provided by each smartphone/chip manufacturer. 
At the time of writing, third-party developers who want to 
make use of the TrustZone are locked out. There are cur-
rently no official mechanisms provided for third-party 
developers to install their own trustlet. However, the Glo-
balPlatform association is currently working on standards 
for implementing and managing TEEs and enabling third-
party developers to access the secure world for use in 
their application [15]. 
c) Proof of concept: Because of missing access to the 
TrustZone, a proof-of-concept was not developed. Howe-
ver the implementation of trustlets in general was addres-
sed in various papers in literature [27, 30]. 
2) Secure Element 
a) Requirements: Access to a secure element installed 
on the Android smartphone. Deploying, installing and 
managing a security domain for the eID applet. Support 
of needed cryptographic algorithms for the eID process. 
b) Existing Solutions: Secure elements on mobile de-
vices exist in different form factors (see Sec. III-B). Fo-
cusing on Android smartphones the most common is the 
UICC. Google replaced the embedded secure element in 
their developer phones with a software emulator called 
Host-based Card Emulation when their Nexus series has 
been released in 2013 [8]. Therefore, the embedded se-
cure element is no longer officially supported by the An-
droid API [9]. The manufactures of removable SD card 
secure elements face these issue by developing their own 
proprietary drivers, based on the seek-for-android open-
source project [13]. All available solutions have in com-
mon, that they are currently not accessible for third-party 
developers.  
c) Proof of concept: Based on the presented concept, 
the secure element should perform the EAC protocol (see 
Sec. III-A) and should store the eID token. For the proof-
of-concept we used a SD card secure element (certgate 
cgCard Type 2) which is accessible via a customized 
middleware based on seek-for-android and open for deve-
lopers. Further experiments were not possible because of 
missing cryptographic algorithms [6] (ALG_EC_SVD-
P_DH_PLAIN for key agreement). Secure elements with 
the JavaCard 3 Java platform  and a modified JCOP SE 
OS (v2.4.1) should fix this issue, but were not available at 
the time of writing.  
3) eID Android Application 
a) Requirements: Application logic to manage eID pro-
cess and communicate with the hardware security com-
ponents (TrustZone, secure element).  
b) Existing Solutions: Currently, two open source pro-
jects (Open eCard [22] and PersoApp [21]) provide a 
mobile Android application for the German eID system. 
Open eCard also supports further identity cards like the 
German and Austrian electronic health insurance card. 
Both applications communicate via different card readers 
with the identity cards. 
c) Proof of concept: As the PersoApp focuses exclusi-
vely on the German eID card, it will be used for further 
experiments. It uses a modular design [21] to support 
different kinds of card readers (Bluetooth, USB, NFC) via 
the so called CardHandler interface. By introducing a new 
CardHandler in Fig. 6 (SECardHandler) and emulating an 
identity card connected to a card reader with a PIN pad, 
we could easily use the PersoApp without any further 
modifications. Therefore the SECardHandler communica-
tes over the SEService and the eID emulator with the se-
cure element. In this design, the TrustZone is left out be-
cause of the restrictions mentioned earlier, but could be 
integrated into the SEService in the future. 
6. Modified PersoApp with SECardHandler, SEService and Secure 
Element (red box) 
C. Conclusion  
The evaluation of the concept revealed some issues which 
must be solved before an implementation and a final product 
could be released. 
The lack of a TrustZone API for third-party developers 
makes it impossible to use it as defined in the concept. Never-
theless, if the GlobalPlatform TEE API gets deployed on An-
droid devices in the future, another evaluation should be done. 
As embedded secure elements are no longer supported on 
Android by default and third-party SD card secure elements 
need additional custom drivers, a possible method of choice 
could be UICCs as they are already distributed in every 
smartphone. The existing management infrastructure of the 
mobile network carriers could be adapted to deploy the eID 
applet onto the devices. Also the problem of missing algo-
rithms can be fixed by using UICCs which support JavaCard 3 
(e.g. Gemalto UpTeq Multi-Tenant SIM [11]). 
Finally, the proof of concept for the Android application 
shows no evidence for possible incompatibilities with the 
concept. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we demonstrated that hardware-based security 
solutions are needed to protect sensitive data. Smartphone 
owners with custom flashed kernels and root privileges are 
able to obtain sensitive information, if only software-based 
security mechanisms are used. The security evaluation 
showed, that two non-critical vulnerabilities can't be avoided. 
Neither the eID token nor the cryptographic keys were com-
promised.  
It's possible to transfer the described concept to eID solu-
tions of other countries as long as a sovereign service provider 
managing the eID tokens is available and the processes are 
compliant with the national law. 
Nevertheless, it is complicated to enroll the concept to An-
droid because of the heterogeneous device hardware: Each 
device needs a secure element and a trusted execution envi-
ronment which is able to understand the APDU commands 
sent by the service provider, support needed algorithms for the 
eID process and provide an API for third-party developers. 
As mentioned in Section VI-C, future work for the imple-
mentation should focus on UICCs as the secure element. Their 
widespread in almost every smartphone and the existing ma-
nagement infrastructure of the mobile network carriers could 
be adapted for the mobile eID concept. Also the use of the 
ARM TrustZone must be reevaluated when manufacturers 
include the GP TEE API [15] into their implementations. 
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